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COMMANDERY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 



WAR PAPER 62. 



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dDMMANDERY OF THE Dl^TI^IdT DF COLUI^BIA. 

WAR PAPERS. 
62 

PREPARED BY COMPANION 

Brevet Brigadier-General 

SAMUEL W. PRICE, 

'I 

U. S. Volunteers. 

AND 

READ AT THE STATED MEETING OP MARCH 7, 19C6. 



7^^'V^'O 



Cbc Crachcr %xm, 

As Was Known to the Army of the Cumberland, 1S63. 



In modern warfare, the army when on the march is con- 
fronted with the difficult problem of provisioning itself and it 
becomes the more embarrassing as it gets farther from its base, 
especially when invading the enemy's country. The line of 
transportation, either by rail or wagon-trains, is often raided 
by the enemy and frequently the supplies are destroyed or 
confiscated, thereby impeding the movements of the invading 
army. 

In ancient wars it was quite different, as thev were not 
handicapped by the transportation of suppHes for the army. 
They depended on the country through which they marched 
for necessary provisions, having neither railroads nor wagon- 
trains. It is recorded of Xerxes, that to feed his immense 
army of soldiers during his campaigns, he sent his commissa- 
ries in advance to collect provisions from every part of the 
empire, then deposit them at suitable stations in his line of 
march. The principal cities through which he passed had to 
furnish a day's meal for the immense host, and for this purpose 
had made preparations many days beforehand. The cost of 
feeding such a multitude brought many citizens to the brink 
of ruin. The island of Thasis, alone, which had to undertake 
this enormous duty, on account of its position out of the main- 
land expended no less a sum than four hundred talents, or 
nearly one hundred thousand pounds in English monev. A 
witty citizen of Abdera recommended his countrymen to 
return thanks to the gods because Xerxes was satisfied with 
one meal in a day. 



Notwithstanding this providence of Xerxes, in a productive 
country his army suffered privations even to famine, when 
the suppHes were exhausted, from the barrenness of the region 
through which he passed, especially in Boetia. When he 
reached the Hellespont his force was greatly diminished by 
famine and pestilence. 

As to other ancient commanders, the technical works upon 
military science treating of army movements do not seem to 
deal with the subject from the gastronomic side, so that in 
reality it seems to be a question for original investigation. 
An examination of several representative biographies of ancient 
commanders does not show that the manner of provisioning 
their armies had received special treatment or consideration 
at the hands of the authors. The information, if therein 
contained, would seem to be parenthetical or incidental to 
other matter. 

This is especially true as to Alexander the Great in feeding 
his army when on the march. On his return from a success- 
ful campaign in India he had reached the river Hydaspes. 
Here he built a fleet in which he sent part of his army down 
the river and the major part to march through the country, 
which was an immense, sandy desert, and in consequence all 
perished in the sand, being unable to procure food or water. 

The work entitled "Caesar's Army" gives only meagre 
information as to how he fed his army on the march. In 
directing his soldiers to carry their provisions, it was not from 
choice, but a necessity, in that wheel conveyances of his 
country of that period, which were constructed for its excellent 
roads, were of too light a character for the rough country 
through which this great soldier conducted his campaigns. 

This was especially true in Great Britain, and it was not 
until the end of the seventeenth centurv that a change in 



these conditions was effected. After the construction of the 
"Mc Adams Roads'' the pack-horse caravans were no longer 
a commercial necessity. 

Gibbon says, "The ration of food for one day weighed about 
one and two-thirds pounds. On short expeditions each 
soldier must carry his own provisions, as manv as seventeen 
days' rations, amounting to twenty-three pounds." The 
ration was usually in the form of coarse flour or unground grain 
which the soldier must crush for himself. 

It is natural to infer from this data that when the contents 
of the haversack was consumed, it was replenished from the 
country through which Caesar's army passed, thereby relieved 
of the encumberance and expense of wagon transportation. 

Napoleon in his Russian campaign made lev.y for provisions 
on the citizens of the towns through which he passed, and also 
required them to give shelter to protect his army from the 
severe, cold weather. 

It will be seen that the ancient commanders of armies 
could, on account of their not having a base of supplies to 
depend on for the feeding of their respective armies, utilize 
their effective strength in battle ; and the commander was able 
to concentrate his thoughts on his aggressive movements, and 
in battle, strategy of evolution. 

The discovery of gunpowder in the mediaeval age thoroughly 
revolutionized the mode of warfare, as the primitive cross- 
bow and arrow, javelin, battle-ax and the battering-ram gave 
place to the musket and cannon ; consequently wagon trans- 
portation became necessary for the heavy munitions of war. 

In modern warfare the Commander-in-Chief in conducting 
an offensive campaign into the enemy's country has necessarily 
to leave a large percentage of his effective force in the rear 
to protect the line of communication, and the ratio of percen- 



tage is augmented the further he gets from his base. This 
was especiahy true in the great and successful campaigns con- 
ducted bv General Rosecrans in 1863. While the battle of 
vStone's River was in progress, General Rosecrans was obliged 
to leave his largest division at Gallatin, Tennessee, to guard. 
About fifteen per cent, of the army of the Cumberland was dis- 
tributed along the line of communication from Louisville to 
Chattanooga, a distance of three hundred and eighteen miles, 
when the battle of Chickamauga was fought. Had this force, 
amounting to eleven thousand, been at the front and engaged 
in this battle, the center of Rosecrans' line would have remained 
intact. 

The modern general commanding is greatly handicapped 
in his offensive movements by uneasiness of mind for the 
safely of the transportation of army supplies. 

In this connection it is well to state, that soon after General 
Thomas assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland 
news came while at supper that Morgan had torn up a small 
portion of the railroad between Nashville and La Verne, and be- 
ing considerably agitated by this intelligence, Thomas remarked 
to his staff, "Morgan gives me more trouble than Bragg." His 
colored cook remarked, "I knows John Morgan ; I used to pull 
tow for him" (for Morgan had a tow factory in Lexington, 
Kentucky, before the war) . 

General Thomas responded, addressing his sable cook, 
"Don't you think that Morgan ought to now himself pull a little 
hemp?" 

The poignant wit was quickly appreciated by the darky, 
who joined with the other hearers in a hearty laugh. 

When it came to the knowledge of the citizens of the loyal 
states that General Sherman, on the eve of his march to the 
sea, had abandoned the railroad — the artery of supplies — 



and had to depend on the country through which he would pass 
for food for his army, considerable apprehension was felt. 
Belieying that the resources of that portion of the south was not 
adequate to the demand of so large an army, General Sherman's 
proposition of change of tactics was not at first received with 
fayor by General Grant and General Thomas, as it would be 
a yiolation of the modern science of war. The former finally 
consented to the enterprise. That General Sherman fed his 
army of sixty thousand comfortably from the country border- 
ing his march and did not deplete by far the horns of plenty, is 
an ample proof against the fallacious plea set up by the Rich- 
mond authorities, that on account of the poverty of the south, 
better and more sufficient food could not be furnished to the 
Federal soldiers, imprisoned at Andersonville, Georgia. 

The capture of Chattanooga by the incomparable strategy 
of Rosecrans was of the greatest importance to the cause of 
the Union in that it was an assurance of the collapse of the 
so-called Confederacy at no distant date. 

To wrest this stronghold from the iron grasp of Rosecrans, 
Lee sent to Bragg, Longstreet's Corps, the flower of the South- 
ern army, but with this reinforcement, Bragg's effort proved 
unsuccessful after three days' hard fighting, for General 
Thomas, the "Rock of Chickamauga" was there, against whom 
the terrific wave of battle dashed in vain. On the night of the 
twenty-first of September, Thomas retired to Chattanooga 
behind hasty entrenchments constructed by Rosecrans the 
day before. 

Like the vulture, who from his high perch looks below for 
the carcass on which to satisfy its rapacious appetite, Bragg 
with his army from the heights of Missionary Ridge and Look- 
out Mountain viewed the army of the Cumberland, hoping 
that from hunger the ranks would be thinned from day to day, 



and that Rosecrans, to prevent a general calamity, would 
surrender the much-coveted position by retiring to his nearest 
base of supplies. But this dream was not to be realized, for 
Rosecrans was equal to the emergency. There was no vulture 
to lie in wait for his carcass. Nor was his army reduced to 
the simple diet of bark and worms, as was the emperor Guati- 
mavin's hoard of barbarous warriors when effectuallv block- 
aded by Cortez, having been imprisoned in the Mexican capital. 
Rosercans line of communication, direct from Bridgeport, 
being broken, Bragg believed, and not without reason, that no 
substitute of transportation could prove adequate to satisfy 
his partially pent-up adversary. 

He knew, too, that the railroad from Nashville to Murfrees- 
boro was another source of embarrassment to the Federal 
commander. 

The bad state of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad 
(vhich was constructed, especially south of Murfreesboro, with 
light rail and stringer track, had come into our possession 
nearly worn out in supplying the rebel army while it lay at 
Murfreesboro; frequent interruptions by the wrecking of the 
trains and by obstructions placed upon the track by the rebels 
reduced the means of transportation, even to Bridgeport, below 
what was really necessary to feed the army at Chattanooga 
alone. 

After Bragg's occupation of Lookout valley it became 
necessary for Rosecrans to substitute wagons for transporta- 
tions of supplies from Bridgeport to his army. Though a 
herculean undertaking, it proved practicable, notwithstanding 
the natural obstacles, as long as the weather continued dry. To 
haul the rations by wagons from Bridgeport to Chattanooga 
(a distance of sixty miles, when only twenty-eight miles by 
rail, through Sequatchie Valley and over Waldon's Ridge) 



occupied five days. For ten days the supply of provisions 
by this method was successful. The standing corn, ready for 
the shock or crib, found on several deserted plantations border- 
ing the wagon route, afiforded ample forage for the teams 
and sufficient opportunity for the trainsmen to vary their 
monotonous army rations. 

However, the favorable auspices were brought to a ter- 
mination by the fall rains which began on the first of October, 
and the roads became almost impassable. The rebel cavalry, 
crossing the Tennessee above Chattanooga, fell upon the 
trains entangled in the mud of the Sequatchie valley, and the 
rocks of the western ascent of Walden's ridge. 

In consequence the rations of Rosecrans' armv, 45,00 
strong, was reduced to less than half, and the artillery and 
headquarter horses were from necessity sent to the rear to 
forage. 

From exhaustion, caused by heavy hauHng, a large number 
of mules fell dead in their tracks. 

On the morning of October the first, I was ordered by 
General Rosecrans to proceed with my regiment, 2 ist Kentuckv 
Volunteer Infantry, to Anderson's Gap. Tennessee, for protect- 
ing and managing trains. The same night I camped ten miles 
from the point of my destination. On the next morning about 
eight o'clock, when within two and one-half miles of the vallev, 
word was received from Lieutenant Colonel J. C Evans of mv 
regiment (who had gone in advance, accompanied by Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Boyd of Major General McCook's staff, to select 
camping ground and a suitable place for packing wagons) 
that a large cavalry force of the enemv (supposed to be a 
division under command of \A'heeler) was advancing down 
the valley, and were in close proximity to Anderson's Gap, for 
the purpose of attacking the train. 



lO 



My adjutant, by reason of my absence (I having been de- 
tained a short time in rear for the purpose of bringing up 
stragglers) moved the command at once at double quick, 
without waiting for me or sending me the information received, 
to the brow of the ridge, where Lieutenant Colonel Evans was 
in waiting. 

The regiment then resumed the double quick to the relief 
of a company of the 6t>th Illinois Infantry, acting as train 
guard, which was then engaged with the enemy. When in and 
near the foot of the ridge and in sight of the rebels, the regiment 
halted and was formed in hne of battle. 

As my command descended farther down, and within a 
few vards of the bottom, it met the train guard (about fifty 
men in number) in some confusion, they having been driven 
back by Wheeler, and without a commander, they were ordered 
to join the regiment, which they promptly did. 

The command had not proceeded far before firing became 
heavy on the left of the road, so much so that a company was 
then deployed as skirmishers in that direction to protect the 
flank. The men advanced slowly, driving the enemv (cheering 
all the while, inspired by the soul-stirring music of the band) 
some twenty-five or thirty minutes. 

The left, being stronger than the right, was advanced some 
twenty yards down the hill After being engaged fifteen 
or twenty minutes it was discovered the rebels were flanking 
the regiment on the right. Captain Sandidge (Company B) 
retarded thoir movements by moving his Companv in that 
direction. Colonel Evans feared that Wheeler would flank the 
regiment owing to his superior numbers, in spite of our efforts 
to prevent it, and possibly get into the rear; by this means 
the regiment would be either captured or destroyed. The 
regiment accompHshed the retreat with great difficultv. 



II 



The road being occupied by the enemy, the 21st Kentucky 
was compelled to ascend the mountain on the left of the road, 
over very stony ground and dense undergrowth and had deep 
ravines to cncoimter. 

The enemy did not pursue any distance, and consequently 
the regiment was saved by retreating to the opposite side of 
the ridge (13 miles) where Companies K and G of my command 
were stationed. 

By way of explanation why I was not with my command 
in the engagement, it is well for me to state that when I had 
descended the mountain more than half way I was told by 
several of my men who were unable to keep up in the rapid 
march, that the rebels were in the road between me and the 
regiment, and that it was impossible for me to proceed any 
farther (as they had been fired upon in their efforts to reach 
the command) without being captured or killed. 

Believing that there were only a few in their way, I collected 
all the stragglers (eight in number) and deployed them in 
front of me for the purpose of reaching, if possible, my regiment 
by compelling the rebels to retire. I had not gone far, however, 
when I was met by one of my men (who had been in the fight), 
and from him I learned that the regiment had fallen back. 

When I received the information that my command was on 

the retreat, I dispatched word to Colonel Evans (supposing 

him to be not far oflf) that there were 75 or 100 wagons in the 

' road upon the side of the mountain that possibly could be saved, 

and to bring the regiment to that point without delav. 

I waited near the wagons some minutes, hoping to hear 
from him, and did not retire till I heard that the rebels were 
advancing and were not far from me. Not being able to find 
anv regiment, I rode back, hoping to meet the two companies 
under command of Major J. E Hoskins, which I had ordered 



12 



to the support of the other companies engaged and caused 
them to return to protect the trains which were miles in advance 
loaded with supplies for the army. I met the companies with- 
in six miles of Anderson's Gap and turned them back. But we 
were not pursued and the trains reached their destination 
in safety. 

Even had we been sufficiently strong to have driven the ene- 
mv, we reached the scene of 'destruction too late to have saved 
the wagons at the foot of the Ridge, for the trains were then in 
possession of the rebels, and most of the wagons destroyed. 
In consequence of the exposure to the rain on the march the 
day before, my guns were in very bad condition and many of 
them unserviceable, but notwithstanding, those which could 
be used were fired with telling effect. 

I am unable to state the loss of the enemy, but from infor- 
mation derived from citizens and from my men who were 
captured and afterwards made their escape, their loss must 
have been heavv; thirty are represented killed and a larger 
number wounded. 

Among the number killed was a colonel and a captain, 
Captain Jack Jones of lyouisville, of the ist Kentucky rebel 
regiment, who is buried at the church near Anderson's Gap; his 
name and rank are in legible characters on head-board. 

Two majors were severely wounded. We captured five 
prisoners; three being unable to keep up were dropped on the 
retreat. 

Mv loss was comparatively small — only three killed, three 
wounded and thirty-eight enlisted men and non-commissioned 
officers missing, my sergeant-major among the number; one 
captain and two lieutenants missing reported the day after to 
me. I omitted to mention in its proper connection that I had 
only 200 guns in the action, only seven companies represented, 



13 



two being detached on special duty and a large detail with 
supplying trains. The enemy had two brigades, their force 
estimated at 5,000. 

I know of no reason wh^• \\'heeler did not pursue us, unless 
deterred by the boldness of my men, believing it the advance 
of a large force and that our falling back of the regiment was 
simply a feint to get them into trouble. Both officers and 
men acted with coolness and bravery without exeception until 
overpowered by overwhelming numbers. 

The number of wagons containing rations destroyed 
amounted to about 300, and 1,800 mules were killed or cap- 
tured. On the estimate of six mules to a wagon, General 
Joseph Wheeler in his report to General Bragg stated "That 
the number of wagons was variously estimated at from 800 
to 1,500." 

The quartermaster in charge of the train, as well as other 
employees, stated that there were 800 mule wagons, besides a 
great number of sutler wagons. After selecting such mules and 
wagons as he needed, Wheeler then destroyed the train by 
burning the wagons and sabering the mules. 

The martial band, before mentioned, the strains of which 
inspired my boys in the determined purpose in their movement 
against the enemy, belonged to an Illinois regiment and were on 
their return from a twenty days' furlough to Chattanooga. 

Lieutenant Colonel Kvans met the members of the band as 
they were progressing up the ridge and not far from its base. 
He commanded them to halt, and addressing the drum major, 
requested him to have the band play some National airs, which 
he promptly refused to do. Thereupon, the Colonel in an 
imperative tone of voice commanded him to strike up and 
"darn quick," at the same time ordering a soldier who was 
nearby to [shoot him dead if he did not obey. That the com- 



14 

mand was immediately obeyed goes without saying and he 
then, without delay, directed his band to play the airs 
requested. This impromptu strategy, in a measure, as before 
intimated, caused the* rebels to promptly retire. 

A few days after the engagement with Wheeler the camp 
was moved on to and near the top of the ridge for the purpose 
of corduroying the road, which was also in a bad condition 
owing to the heavy and frequent rains. The camp was a 
comparatively safe one as the rebel cavalry confined their 
operations to the valley. Many of my command not having 
Johnnie rebs to hunt, directed their attentions to deer and 
wild turkeys, which would appear daily not very remote from 
the camp. In consequence they were* able to supplement 
the hard tack, sow belly, beans and cofifee, by venison and 
turkey, a bill of fare which was fit to set before a king, But 
whenever they sat down to the meal the thought of the 
suffering of their comrades at Chattanooga because of short 
rations, made the venison less savory. 

I finally had to issue order against the practice, as it had 
become excessive; in that it was an expenditure of Uncle 
Sam's ammunition. The constant passing of trains and officers 
going to and from the army gave interest to the camp, which 
otherwise would have been monotonous 'on the dreary moun- 
tain top. 

Frequent were the visitors to the camp, some from motives 
of friendship, and others for convenience would make it a 
station by stopping over night on their journey. One after- 
noon, near nightfall, the regiment was honored by a visit from 
Generals Rosecrans and Garfield, who were traveling to Nash- 
ville after their connection with the Army of the Cumberland 
had been severed. When they rode up to my headquarters, 
I requested them to dismount and spend the night with me, 



15 

which invitation was readily accepted. 1 assigned them to niy 
quarters, and my chum, Lieutenant Evans, and I sought 
beds elsewhere. Unfortunateh- for the distinguished guests a 
heavy rain came up during the night, greatly interfering with 
the comfort of the travelers, for in the morning when I went 
to inquire how thev had spent the night, I found General 
Garfield seated on the side of the rustic bed emptying the water 
out of his boot, and his comrade arranging his coat before the 
fire to dry. I felt disposed to apologize, but I had done the 
best I could for their comfort. This brought vividly to General 
Garfield's mind mv application, made onlv a few days before, 
for a tent, which had been refused me. AVith an appreciative 
twinkle in his eve, he called for the regimental quartermaster, 
and told him to make out a requisition for a tent for me. This 
was promptly done and presented to General Garfield, who 
made the following endorsement on the margin: "1 most 
earnestlv recommend that a tent be issued to Colonel Price, 
for I know from my own experience that no officer in the army 
needs a new one more than he does." It is needless to say that 
the recommendation was recognized favorably, and I got 
what I had so long needed and desired. General Garfield, 
in conversation afterwards with me, referred to this circum- 
stance as a smart piece of strategy on my part to obtain a new 
tent. The saddle of venison on which the guests were regaled 
is so intimately associated with the remembrance of their 
agreeable visit, that the latter cannot be mentioned without 
bringing to mind the secret history of the steak. Soon after 
the visitors had departed, the Captain of Company C brought 
to me one of his men (a native of the Emerald Isle) with the 
complaint that he had the day before violated a solemn edict 
promulgated through the adjutant. He wanted to know the 
penalty for the commission of the offence. The soldier had 



i6 



killed a deer with the government ammunition. As the 
offender could not prefer the common plea of self-defence 
usual in the case of a sheep or a hog, he .pleaded guilty to the 
charge. But when the stern judge had passed sentence and 
assigned him to three hours' hard labor, Pat, feeling the in- 
justice of the decision, spoke up and said- "If it plaze yer 
Honor, I'd Hke to know which is worse, to accept stolen goods 
or to stale them?" It is needless to say that I at once dis- 
charged the prisoner. As Captain Sherrard had never before 
thought it necessary to refer his men to me to discipline, I 
always charged him with having put up "a job" in order to 
fortify for dereliction of dutv in letting such offenders go un- 
punished. He was himself a wilful particeps criminis. 

General Rosecrans was relieved of the command on the 
nineteenth of October. That day he rode to Browns' Ferry 
with General W. F. Smith, his chief engineer, and General 
J.J. Re3molds, his chief of staff, making a general examination 
of the river, ^ith respect to selecting a point below lyOokout 
mountain for throwing the bridges, and a special examination 
of Brown's Ferry, where the bridge was finally thrown. vSoon 
after General Grant assumed command of the armies, he carried 
out General Rosecrans' plan of effecting a landing of troops on 
the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry by means of a 
pontoon bridge, which was constructed with the boats which 
noiselessly floated down the river at 3 o'clock A. M. in close 
proximity to the rebel pickets stationed for seven miles on the 
south side of the river. The flotilla consisted of 52 boats 
occupied by 1,500 men, including the crew, all under command 
of General Hazen. Of this strategy there is nothing in ancient 
history that has a parallel to its ingenuity, except that when 
Cyrus made a successful assault on Babylon under the rule of 
Belshazzer. This was made on a day Avhen the ruler, relying 



17 

upon the height and strength of the walls, had given himself 
up to the riot and debauchery of a grand public festival. 

Cyrus had previouslv caused a canal which ran west of 
the city and carried olT the superfluous water of the Euphrates 
into the Lake Micocris, to be cleared out, in order to turn the 
river into it, which by this means was rendered so shallow 
that his soldiers were able to penetrate along its bed into the 
citv- The occupation of Lookout valley proved a key to the 
situation, as it resulted in the capture of Lookout mountain 
which therefore enabled Hooker to proceed down the east 
side of the mountain and threaten Bragg's rear. The move- 
ments of Hooker on his left and Sherman on his right and the 
successful charge of the Army of the Cumberland on Bragg's 
center, caused the enemy to retire. 

The natural inquiry of the future historian, in my opinion, 
will be why Rosecrans was not permitted by the authorities 
at Washington to carry out his strategy, for with the reinforce- 
ments asked for he could have destroyed Bragg or compelled 
him to descend from his lofty perch and to have sought a 
more southernly climate. 

In consequence the direct line of communication would 
have been restored several weeks sooner. 

His body rests yonder in the National bivouac of the dead, 
and where also lie the ashes of Sheridan. Brannan, Baird, and 
Bovnton who fought under him. 

The patriotic visitor to the Arlington Cemetery in the future, 
if not now, will be pointed with the finger of pride to Rosecrans 
grave, accompanied with the words: "There lies all that is 
mortal of the hero of Rich mountain, Corinth, Stone's River, 
and Chattanooga. Peace be to his ashes." 



